Immigration, Europe and the ‘new’ cultural dimension

WOUTER VAN DER BRUG1 & JOOST VAN SPANJE2
1Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam/Amsterdam School for Social Science Research, The Netherlands; 2European University Institute, Florence, Italy/Amsterdam School of Communications Research, The Netherlands

Abstract. Kriesi et al. announced the birth of a new cleavage in contemporary Western Europe, one dividing the winners and losers of globalisation. Their studies in 2006 and 2008 contain analyses of party positions in six countries, based on the contents of editorial sections of newspapers. This article challenges the main conclusion of Kriesi et al. by demonstrating – on the basis of two expert surveys – that party positions are mainly structured by one dimension. The structure detected by Kriesi et al. in their analysis of parties is not found, except concerning voter positions. A consequence of this article’s findings is that large groups of citizens are not represented by any parties, in particular those who are left-wing on socio-economic issues and right-wing on cultural issues. The article in its conclusion discusses possible causes for the differences between these findings and those of Kriesi et al., and the implications of these findings for democratic representation.

Introduction

In a large-scale comparative research project, Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008) investigate the possible development of a new cleavage in Western European countries. The guiding hypothesis of their study is that this new cleavage finds its origin in a structural conflict between the winners and losers of globalisation. As a result of globalisation there is increasing economic competition (because of open markets) and increasing cultural competition (because of immigration). For some people – the well-educated, qualified employees – this provides all kinds of opportunities. They will be the winners. The losers are those with fewer skills, who see their economic sectors displaced to India or China, or who are challenged by the competition of workers from central European countries, who come to work in their country after the EU enlargement. They are likely to call for protectionist measures to shield national economies from worldwide competition, and to oppose further European integration and further immigration to their country. Kriesi and his colleagues expect this new structural conflict to develop into an ideological dimension that structures party behaviour in the national political arenas.
Kriesi et al. (2006) study party positions on the basis of a content analysis of the editorial part of two newspapers in each of six West European countries. On the basis of these data, spatial configurations are provided of parties, which indicate that ‘the new cleavage has become embedded into existing two-dimensional national political spaces’: an economic and a cultural dimension. According to Kriesi et al., both dimensions transformed between the 1970s and the early 2000s. Environmentalism, which used to be part of the cultural dimension, has now become integrated in the economic dimension. In the 1970s, the cultural dimension mainly structured issues related to cultural liberalism, but nowadays the issues of (resistance to) immigration and (opposition to) European unification have become important new elements of the cultural dimension. The rise of right-wing populist parties in Europe can be understood to some extent by the development of this new conflict dimension. The purpose of this article is to establish whether the structural conflict between winners and losers of globalisation has changed the nature of party competition in the way described by Kriesi et al. In order to do so, we will employ two kinds of data sources: expert judgements of party positions and survey data of voters.

For a number of reasons it is important that the claims made by Kriesi et al. (2006) are tested on the basis of other data sources. First of all, Kriesi et al. make generalised claims about the changes in the ‘national political space’ in the six countries that they study. Yet, editorial sections of newspapers are not the most obvious source of information to detect changes in party positions. They represent how these changes are presented in the mass media, but the media may not accurately describe where parties stand on various issues. As will be argued below, content analyses of campaign coverage in the media is also sensitive to changes in the political agenda, so that the changes of party positions do not (only) reflect ideological changes. It is important therefore that the results based on media contents are cross-validated on the basis of other indicators of party positions. Second, as will be discussed below, there are theoretical reasons to expect party systems to organise along one dominant dimension, which is indeed what the expert data indicate.

Third, the results of Kriesi et al. (2008) show that position taking of parties and opinions of voters are structured by the same two ideological dimensions. In other words, there is a good fit between the demand and supply side of the electoral process in the six countries they study, which is good news in terms of political representation. We will show, however, that there is a substantial mismatch between party positions (which are largely structured by one dimension) and opinions of voters (which are structured by two dimensions). The findings presented here give rise to less optimistic conclusions about the quality of democratic representation in Western Europe than would be warranted on the basis of Kriesi et al.’s findings. Finally, our data allow one to test
the proposition of Kriesi et al. for a much larger set of countries. Since the prediction is that a new cleavage develops in response to a structural conflict in Western societies, one would expect to find evidence of this new cleavage in all Western societies. The analyses presented in this article thus allow for generalisation to a larger number of contexts. Before we turn to the analyses, we will discuss existing views on party system change in Western Europe.

**New ideological dimensions?**

According to Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008), two dimensions structure the behaviour of political parties: a socio-economic and a socio-cultural dimension. There are, however, good theoretical reasons to expect party systems to organise along one dominant dimension. The main reason is that in parliament parties are often constrained by the necessity to collaborate with other parties. This is particularly true for governing parties in non-majoritarian electoral systems. Being a member of a government coalition is a valuable asset for parties, since it will increase the career opportunities of their politicians and their ability to implement certain policies. Therefore, parties have an incentive to avoid putting issues on the agenda about which they disagree to such an extent that no acceptable compromise can be reached. Instead of fighting simultaneously at different fronts, they must decide ‘which battle do we want most to win?’ (Schattschneider 1975 [1960]: 67).¹ Normally, parties will organise coalitions with actors that are close on the conflict dimension they consider most important. This becomes the dominant dimension of conflict in the parliamentary arena because parties avoid ‘fighting’ conflicts that do not correspond with this dimension, or that cannot be made compatible with it.

Parties in opposition operate under fewer constraints, but just like government parties they also often have incentives not to politicise issues that are not integrated into the dominant conflict dimension. A first incentive relates to their cooperation with other parties in parliament. For opposition parties it is important to establish good working relations with other parties in order to get support for amendments and motions, or to enhance the chances of becoming a governing party in the future. Like government parties, opposition parties collaborate most with parties that are similar on the dominant dimension. Moreover, issues that do not correspond to positions on the dominant dimension often divide parties internally, which is also a reason for them not to politicise the issue. So, we may theoretically expect that a single ideological dimension structures the behaviour of parties.

When studying the party choice of citizens, the same logic applies. Students of public opinion have often found that more than one ideological dimension
structures the opinions of citizens on a large number of issues (e.g., Middendorp 1991; Kitschelt & McGann 1995). At the same time, in almost all West-European countries, party choice turns out to be structured by one single ideological dimension: left/right (e.g., Oppenhuis 1995; Van der Eijk & Franklin 1996; Van der Eijk et al. 1999). These findings do not contradict each other. When casting a vote, voters are simply constrained by the supply side. In the words of Sartori (1976: 338): ‘When the citizen speaks, he may have many things to say. But when he is coerced into casting a . . . vote, he may well have to . . . vote for the party . . . perceived as closest on the left-right spectrum.’ However, if party positions are structured by one dimension and opinions of citizens by two or more dimensions, there will be groups of citizens whose combinations of issue positions cannot be represented by the party for which they voted.

Many prior studies show that across various European systems the behaviour of parties and voters alike has been structured largely by a left-right dimension, which until the 1990s remains the dominant ideological dimension in many of these countries (e.g., Fuchs & Klingemann 1990; Klingemann, et al. 1994; Hix 1999). Left-right is sometimes seen as the equivalent of a socio-economic dimension. However, the substantive meaning of left-right is not fixed, but may vary across countries and over time. In Western Europe the left-right dimension has assimilated new political issues, so that parties’ left-right positions summarise their positions on a large number of concrete issues in most European countries (e.g., Fuchs & Klingemann 1990; Kitschelt & McGann 1995). As a case in point, environmentalism has gradually become associated with the political left. Recently, Van der Brug et al. (2005) showed that the electoral performance of anti-immigration parties can be very well explained in terms of party competition on a left-right dimension. This suggests that the immigration issue – which lies at the heart of the rise of these parties – has also become largely absorbed by the left-right dimension.

However, the study of Kriesi et al. (2008) indicates that there are two important dimensions – an economic and a cultural one – and that positions on immigration are related to the latter dimension. These findings largely confirm Kitschelt and McGann (1995), who also distinguish two dimensions in his landmark study on the radical right. On the one hand, there is a traditional economic axis, ranging from socialist to capitalist policies. On the other, there is an authoritarian-libertarian dimension, often referred to as a socio-cultural cleavage. According to Kitschelt, these dimensions were orthogonal in the late 1980s. Recently, he has added the idea that the socio-cultural dimension has gained importance at the expense of the influence of traditional economic issues (Kitschelt 2004). Parties distinguish themselves from each other more in terms of issues related to the socio-cultural dimension, while they converge on the socio-economic dimension. As a consequence, most party systems would
nowadays be largely unidimensional. In that sense, Kitschelt (2004) and Kriesi et al. (2006) contradict each other. For theoretical reasons outlined above, it is more likely that we will find the unidimensional structure that Kitschelt (2004) describes than the two-dimensional structure of Kriesi et al. (2006).

This leaves open the question how to account for the fact that Kriesi et al. detect a two-dimensional structure in the six countries they study. The spatial configurations of Kriesi et al. are based on positive and negative associations between parties and certain policy issues in editorial sections of newspapers. When a party is often described as referring negatively to the EU, the party will be located close to the negative end of a European integration scale. Yet, between two elections, the topics discussed may be very different because there are different issues on the agenda. If European integration is hardly discussed in another election, the same party suddenly moves from a strong anti-EU to a neutral position. In the configurations that Kriesi et al. present, the movements of parties between two elections are so large that it seems very implausible that these reflect ideological changes of parties only. It seems most plausible that these movements also reflect changes in the political agenda over time.

Those who present West European party systems as two-dimensional do not entirely agree on the nature of these dimensions. Kriesi et al. refer to the first dimension as an ‘economic dimension’. Yet, party positions on environmental protection have become part of this dimension, so that the term ‘economic dimension’ may not be suitable. The substantive meaning of the second dimension is not entirely clear either. In Kitschelt’s conceptualisation of what he calls the ‘authoritarian-libertarian dimension’, this consists of three building blocks (De Lange 2007). A first building block is inclusive versus exclusive attitudes towards socio-cultural variety. A second element is the degree to which individuals have a say in collective decisions. A third aspect is individual autonomy versus compliance with collectively shared norms. The description of this dimension is generally in line with that of the Green/Alternative/Libertarian (GAL) versus Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist (TAN) distinction by Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002). All three elements can also be found in this distinction: GAL parties are against discrimination (first aspect), in favour of the notion of participatory democracy (second), and are advocates of what is often perceived as individual freedoms and rights, such as the freedom of speech and the right to opt for abortion, same-sex marriage and euthanasia (third). De Lange (2007) argues, however, that these three elements do not always coincide. The List Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands occupies a centrist position on the cultural dimension, if it is operationalised on the basis of these three ‘building blocks’. The position of the Belgian Vlaams Blok is on the authoritarian side of the spectrum, as expected, but it is not very outspoken. This is caused by the fact that populist parties are largely in favour
of certain forms of direct democracy (De Lange 2007). Moreover, there is evidence that right-wing populist parties adapt their authoritarian stands in response to the recent wave of Islamophobia in Western Europe. In the words of Mudde: ‘[I]t is particularly in their Islamophobia that populist radical right parties present themselves as fierce defenders of liberal democracy, including various freedoms that until recently have been secondary to these parties (e.g. equality of sexes)’ (Mudde 2007: 78–79).

Attitudes towards European integration are a central element in the conceptualisation of the new ‘globalisation’ cleavage by Kriesi et al. (2006), but it is not a central element in Kitschelt’s operationalisation of the cultural dimension. The finding of Kriesi and his colleagues that positions on European integration are an element of this second dimension is in line with results of Hooghe et al. (2002) and Hix (2002). It also concurs with an analysis of party positions by Van der Eijk and Franklin (2007), who show that positions on EU policies are unrelated to left-right in most countries. Marks and Steenbergen (2002) have argued, however, that positions on EU integration have become embedded in the left-right dimension in most countries.

Hypotheses

As argued above, there are theoretical and methodological reasons to doubt the results of Kriesi et al. In this article we will set out by testing the robustness of the findings by Kriesi et al. on the basis of other data. We therefore formulate our hypotheses on the basis of the core argument of that study, which is that two dimensions exist in most West European countries: an economic and a cultural one. The first hypothesis is therefore:

\[ H1a: \text{Party positions will be structured largely by two dimensions.} \]

On the basis of Kriesi et al., we have clear expectations about the content of these two dimensions. The economic dimension structures positions on socio-economic policies.\(^3\) The cultural dimension structures issues related to individual freedom. In addition, positions on immigration and EU unification have become integrated in the cultural dimension. This allows the formulation of two other hypotheses about the nature of the two dimensions:

\[ H1b: \text{The first dimension is a socio-economic dimension, which structures party positions on socio-economic issues such as income distribution.} \]

\[ H1c: \text{The second dimension is a cultural dimension, which structures party positions on matters of individual autonomy versus compliance} \]
with collectively shared norms, European integration and immigration policies.

Kriesi et al. (2008) provide convincing evidence that the opinions of voters are structured by two dimensions in the six countries that they study. We will attempt to replicate their findings for a larger number of countries and expect to obtain highly similar results. Therefore, the same hypotheses for the voters as for the parties can be formulated, which are thus:

- \( H2a \): Citizens’ positions will be structured largely by two dimensions.
- \( H2b \): The first dimension is a socio-economic dimension, which structures citizens’ positions on socio-economic issues such as income distribution.
- \( H2c \): The second dimension is a cultural dimension, which structures citizens’ positions on matters of individual autonomy versus compliance with collectively shared norms, European integration and immigration policies.

We will first focus on the positions of political parties. We use expert surveys of 82 political parties in 14 of the 15 countries that were EU members before the enlargement of 2004: Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. It is possible, of course, that cross-national differences exist, but since the new dimensions that Kriesi et al. (2006) describe are rooted in structural conflicts that exist throughout Western Europe, we would expect the same structures underneath party positions to exist in all these countries. Parties from Luxembourg are not included because not all the necessary data are available for this country. The processes that lead to the developments of new dimensions are likely to be significantly different in formerly communist countries, which is why we decided not to include these countries in the analyses. After presenting the cross-national results for the positions of parties, we turn to the positions of citizens, for which we rely on the European Social Survey 2 (Jowell et al. 2005). We analyse data from all 15 old Member States of the EU, including Luxembourg.

**Data and method**

To measure positions of parties, we combined data from two expert surveys: one conducted by Benoit and Laver (2006) and one by Hooghe et al. (2002). Details on the scales employed in this study are listed in the Appendix. Expert
survey data have some advantages over other data sources, such as the a posteriori coding of media content that was used by Kriesi et al. (2006), as well as some drawbacks. An advantage of the inductive approach of Kriesi et al. is that party positions are measured on all policy categories that are discussed in the media. Moreover, there is information about how important these issues are. This would also be the advantage of the use of election manifestos to measure party positions. In the theoretical section, we have, however, called attention to some drawbacks. The main drawback of content analyses of party programmes or media is that these contents reflect changes in the political agenda’s as well as ideological changes. This leads to an exaggeration of the ideological movements of parties. A priori defined scales do not have this drawback.

However, a possible danger of a priori defined variables in expert surveys is that these could miss some relevant issue dimensions, or may contain dimensions that are politically irrelevant. Since this study builds upon the work of Kriesi et al., we have clear expectations about a number of policy dimensions and about the relationships between these. Since the purpose of this study is not to detect new dimensions, but to cross validate insights from previous works with other data sources, predefined scales are to be preferred.

Benoit and Laver (2006: 71–76) mention three advantages of the use of expert surveys. The scholar who conducts the expert survey can increase the number of experts (and with this, hopefully, the number of observations) so that his or her estimates become increasingly more accurate. This way, the information can relatively easily be made more accurate, and, moreover, make estimations of the uncertainty associated with this information. Furthermore, Benoit and Laver argue that the discipline of political science is in need of the consensus of well-established experts. This way, the obvious problems arising when using information provided by only one or a small number of country experts can be circumvented in order to establish the best possible measurements of unobservable phenomena in political science. Finally, a more mundane argument concerns the availability of data. Other data of a similar accuracy from so many countries simply does not exist on contemporary Western European party politics.

To measure party positions on the first (the ‘economic’) dimension, we have the following indicators:

- Left-right: measured on a scale ranging from left (1) to right (10)
- Taxes versus spending: indicated by a scale varying from ‘promotes raising taxes to increase public services’ (1) to ‘promotes cutting public services to cut taxes’ (20)
• Economy: scale ranging from maximal government influence in the economy (0) to minimal government influence in the economy (10)

Indicators of the second (the ‘cultural’) dimension are:

• Immigration: scale ranging from ‘not very restrictive’ (0) to ‘very restrictive’ (10)
• European enlargement: scale ranging from ‘strongly opposes accession of large wave’ (1) to ‘strongly favours accession of large wave’ (7)
• European integration: scale ranging from ‘strongly opposed to European integration’ (1) to ‘strongly in favour of European integration’ (7)
• Democratic freedom and rights (GAL-TAN): scale ranging from ‘libertarian/post-materialist’ (0) to ‘authoritarian/traditionalist’ (10)
• Left-right: measured on a scale ranging from left (1) to right (10)

Note that left-right was traditionally largely associated with socio-economic policies. However, left-right also has a cultural component (e.g., Kitschelt 2004; Van der Brug et al. 2005; Kriesi et al. 2006). Therefore, we will assess whether left-right is an indicator of the economic as well as the cultural dimension.

In the second part of the article we will concentrate on positions of voters, and base the analyses on the European Social Survey 2. The indicators of an economic dimension are:

• Reductions of income differences: respondents are asked to give their opinion by means of a 5-point Likert scale on the following statement: ‘The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels’
• Left-right positions: respondents are asked to give their position on a scale ranging from ‘left’ (0) to ‘right’ (10)

Indicators of a cultural dimension are:

• Freedom for homosexuals: respondents are asked to give their opinion by means of a 5-point Likert scale on the following statement: ‘Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish’
• Immigration: respondents are asked: ‘Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?’ They respond on a scale ranging from ‘worse place to live’ (0) to ‘better place to live’ (10)
• European unification: scale ranging from ‘unification has gone too far’ (0) to ‘unification should be pushed further’ (10)
• Left-right positions: respondents are asked to give their position on a scale ranging from ‘left’ (0) to ‘right’ (10).

As explained above, left-right may be associated with the economic as well as the cultural dimension. The European Social Survey contains several questions related to immigration, yet we included only one of these in the analyses. The reason for not including all ‘immigration’ items is that we would then run the risk that the cultural dimension would become completely dominated by issues related to immigration only. This particular item was selected because it is the most general statement about the presence of immigrants in the survey. We will test all hypotheses by way of confirmatory factor analyses (using AMOS 7). Whenever models have a poor fit, we will attempt to improve upon those models.

Results: Analyses of party positions across 14 countries

In order to test $H1a$, $H1b$ and $H1c$, we estimated a confirmatory factor analysis model as presented in Figure 1, which displays the estimates of the model based on Kriesi et al. (2006) on the basis of expert surveys. This model consists of two latent dimensions, which we labelled an economic and a cultural dimension, in line with Kriesi et al. The first dimension has two unique indicators and the second dimension four. Left-right is modelled to be an indicator of both dimensions. The model also includes a correlation between the two EU-related variables because excluding this correlation would drastically worsen the model’s fit. Figure 1 presents the standardised solutions of this model.

The first indication of the fit of the model is provided by the Chi$^2$, which provides a test of the null-hypothesis that this causal model gave rise to the correlations in the data. With 11 degrees of freedom and a Chi$^2$ of 61, this model should be rejected. Another indicator of the model’s fit is the RMSEA, which in contradistinction to the Chi$^2$ is not dependent upon sample size. It has to be below 0.10 to conclude that the model fits the data sufficiently well, and below 0.05 to conclude that the model is well-specified (e.g., Browne & Cudeck 1993). In this case, the RMSEA is 0.24, so that this model needs to be rejected.

If we now look at the estimated parameters, we see that the two dimensions are strongly correlated ($r = 0.72$), so that the two dimensions share 52 per cent of their variance. So, even if we would accept the model presented in Figure 1, it is clear that party positions on these topics are not structured by two separate dimensions. $H1a$ should therefore be rejected. The three indicators of the ‘economic dimension’ are all strongly related to this latent variable, so that there is some support for $H1b$. However, the five indicators of the ‘cultural
dimension’ are related very differently to this latent variable. So, there is no support for $H1c$. One could perhaps think that the failure of the model to fit would be due to the presence of the two EU variables. This is not the case, however. Moreover, the EU variables must be included in the model because theoretically they are at the heart of the ‘losers of globalisation’ cleavage.

On the basis of modification indices, we improved upon the model presented in Figure 1. This yielded a model where most of the manifest variables are indicators of both the economic and the cultural dimension. A graph with the full path diagram would become quite unintelligible, which is why the parameter estimates are presented in Table 1. This model contains all parameters of the model in Figure 1 (including the correlation between the two EU-related variables) and adds a few extra. The fit of the model presented in Table 1 is on the edge of being satisfactory. The only possible improvements can be made by adding more relationships between the indicators of the two

Figure 1. Structural equation model to test $H1a$ through $H1c$ for parties across 14 countries. Notes: df = 11; Chi$^2$ = 61.2; p = 0.000; RMSEA = 0.237; CFI = 0.927; n = 82.
dimensions, not by adding more effects between the two dimensions and the indicators. Adding these correlations did not substantively alter the other parameters. Because we are interested in the latent structure underneath these party positions, and not in the correlations between the different indicators that remain after the effects of the latent variables are considered, we did not add more of these correlations to the model.

A number of important conclusions can be drawn from the model in Table 1. The first conclusion is that – at the level of political parties – positions of immigration and on the Green-Alternative-Liberal versus Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist scales are more closely linked to the first than to the second dimension. So, if we look at the older democracies within the EU, party positions on a number of these newer issues are mostly integrated into one more ‘traditional’ dimension, which therefore should not be called ‘economic’. The only policy domain that stands out is the ‘European Union’, which is in accordance with the relevant literature (Hooghe et al. 2002). This appears to be an independent dimension, even though positions on EU enlargement are somewhat related to the first dimension as well.

We have cross-validated these findings by employing an exploratory Principle Components Analysis (PCA) on the seven items of the models presented in Figure 1 and Table 1.6 The results of this PCA (in Table 2) display even clearer the two-dimensional structure that we saw in Table 1. These two dimensions describe almost all variance in the original seven variables (more than 88 per cent of the variance is explained). Almost all issues are strongly related to the first dimension. The only issues not integrated into this dimension are those that pertain to the EU, which therefore load on a second dimension. In the final section, we will discuss the implications of these findings.

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Table 1. Parameter estimates of structural equation model to test an alternative model across 14 countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Economic dimension</th>
<th>Cultural dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>–0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gal-Tan</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>–0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>–0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU integration</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU enlargement</td>
<td>–0.31</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: $df = 9$; Chi\(^2\) = 17.0; $p = 0.049$; RMSEA = 0.105; CFI = 0.988; $n = 82$. The estimated correlation between the economic and the cultural dimensions is 0.37.
Now we turn to an analysis of the structure underneath positions of citizens. We expected that positions of voters would be structured similarly to positions of parties and therefore we test the same set of hypotheses (H2a–H2c) for voters as we tested for parties. These hypotheses, based on Kriesi et al. (2006), are tested by means of a Structural Equation Model (see Figure 2). The Chi² statistic of 55, with 4 degrees of freedom, suggests that this model should be rejected. However, the Chi² is inflated by the very large sample size (n = 22,815). In this case, the RMSEA provides a better measure of the fit of the model: an RMSEA of 0.024 shows that this model fits the data very well.

In line with H2a, the model in Figure 2 shows that the two latent dimensions are not correlated. However, the latent structure is not very strong. The first dimension is very strongly related to ‘reduction of income differences’, but hardly to left/right positions. So, how citizens perceive themselves in terms of left/right is not strongly related to their views on income distribution. The second dimension is most strongly related to attitudes towards immigrants, and also to attitudes towards the EU, albeit to a lesser extent. Only a rather weak relationship exists between these issues, on the one hand, and libertarian views on homosexuality, on the other.

Like in the analyses of party positions, we cross-validated these findings by employing an exploratory Principle Components Analysis (PCA) on the five items of the models presented in Figure 2. The results of this PCA (in Table 3) display even clearer the two-dimensional structure that we saw in Figure 2.

### Table 2. Parameter estimates of exploratory PCA across 14 countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Component 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gal-Tan</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU integration</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td><strong>0.93</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU enlargement</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td><strong>0.92</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Results of PCA with Varimax rotation. Factor loadings above 0.50 are printed in bold.

**Results: Positions of citizens across 15 countries**

Now we turn to an analysis of the structure underneath positions of citizens. We expected that positions of voters would be structured similarly to positions of parties and therefore we test the same set of hypotheses (H2a–H2c) for voters as we tested for parties. These hypotheses, based on Kriesi et al. (2006), are tested by means of a Structural Equation Model (see Figure 2). The Chi² statistic of 55, with 4 degrees of freedom, suggests that this model should be rejected. However, the Chi² is inflated by the very large sample size (n = 22,815). In this case, the RMSEA provides a better measure of the fit of the model: an RMSEA of 0.024 shows that this model fits the data very well.

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(H2a). The first one is an economic dimension, but since only one indicator is strongly related to this dimension, we cannot draw too many conclusions about the substantive content of this first dimension. No unequivocal conclusions about the nature of the first dimension (H2b) are warranted. The second dimension is indeed mostly related to libertarian views on homosexuality, attitudes towards immigration and attitudes towards the EU (H2c). The structure in the attitudes of citizens is thus in line with the theoretical expectations of Kriesi et al.

**Electoral representation**

The analyses show that at least two dimensions underlie attitudes of voters towards a number of important political issues that have been salient during the last decade: a socio-economic dimension and a cultural dimension.
However, the analyses also showed that party positions on these dimensions are so strongly correlated that the party systems in most Member States of the EU are unidimensional, with the exception of the issue of European integration. Here we explore the consequences of this mismatch between voters and parties for political representation.

In order to assess the extent to which opinions of voters are reflected by the positions of the parties for which they can vote, we should ideally have measures of positions of parties and voters on the same attitude scales. Unfortunately, however, the items in the expert surveys and the voter survey are not the same (even though some are pretty similar). To still get an idea of the match between positions of voters and those of parties, we may begin by looking at the distribution of parties on economic and cultural issues. Figure 3 shows the positions of parties on economic issues (measured by the variable LRECON) and positions on immigrants (measured by the variable ‘Immigration’ in the Benoit and Laver expert survey). Both items are described in the Appendix. The two items share more than half of their variance (the correlation is 0.727) and, as a consequence, the factor analyses showed that these items are structured by one latent dimension. For the sake of simplicity, we may think of four types of parties, which we may distinguish on the basis of two dichotomies: left-leaning or right-leaning on economic issues and ‘tough’ or ‘soft’ on immigration. As can be seen clearly in Figure 3, most parties are located either in the upper right or lower left corner of the graph. There are some parties that are right-leaning on economic issues but ‘soft’ on immigration, yet there are only two parties that are economically left-wing and tough on immigration: the Danish Social Democrats and the Finnish Centre Party (KESK), and even these are just on the ‘border’ of that quadrant in Figure 3.

Let us now compare the distribution of party positions with the distribution of attitudes of voters. For this purpose, we will again look at two items that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Structuring of citizens’ attitudes (exploratory PCA across 15 countries)</th>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Component 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduction of income differences</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right</td>
<td>−0.21</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuals free to live as they wish</td>
<td>−0.55</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU unification</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Results of PCA with Varimax rotation. Factor loadings above 0.50 are printed in bold.
represent each of the two dimensions (the economic and the cultural dimension). The item that is most indicative of positions of citizens on the socio-economic dimension is the item on income distribution (whether differences should become smaller or larger). This item was measured on a 5-point scale. To measure positions on the second dimension, we employ the item with the strongest loading on the cultural dimension: whether immigrants make a country a better or a worse place in which to live. This item is measured on a 11-point scale. Since both items are measured on categorical scales, we cannot present the distribution of citizens with a scatterplot such as Figure 3. As a first step, we thus look at a $3 \times 3$ table, presented in Table 4, which includes the centre categories of the 5- and 11-point scales.\footnote{Two important conclusions can be drawn from the figures presented in Table 4. First, the size of the group in favour of reducing differences in income is about twice the size of the group that does not agree (‘neutral’ or ‘disagrees’) with a reduction of income differences. Unfortunately there are no other items that measure positions on socio-economic policies, but on the basis of this single item, the distribution of citizens seems skewed to the left in the socio-economic domain in the countries that we study. Second, across these 15 countries, the largest of these nine groups of voters consists of those who are left-leaning on socio-economic issues, and who feel that immigrants make the country a worse place in which to live. This group of voters is currently not

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figures/figure3.png}
\caption{Distribution of parties on two main ideological dimensions.}
\source{Analyses by the authors based on data from Hooghe et al. (2002); Benoit and Laver (2006).}
\end{figure}
represented by any party because Figure 3 showed that virtually no parties exist that combine a ‘right-wing’ position on cultural issues with a ‘left-wing’ position on socio-economic issues.

Table 4 shows the percentage of respondents in nine different categories in all 15 countries. Table 5 presents the differences between the countries, but for ease of presentation distinguishes four groups.9 From the perspective of democratic representation, the most important group is Type 1: citizens who are left-leaning on socio-economic policies and right-leaning on immigration. Figure 3 showed that this combination of positions is not available at the supply side, so that these citizens cannot be represented by any parties. Table 5 shows that the size of this group varies a lot across countries: between 10 per cent in Denmark to 60 per cent in Greece. In nine out of 15 countries, this is the largest of the four groups. Moreover, in 14 out of 15 countries, the majority of the citizens agree with the statement that income differences must be reduced. Only in Denmark is this different, which may be due to the fact that Denmark is already a very egalitarian society. We will not attempt to explain the differences between these 15 countries because that is clearly beyond the topic of this article.

Conclusions

Kriesi et al. (2006) announced the birth of a new cleavage in contemporary Europe – one dividing the winners and losers of globalisation. The winners would be in favour of EU unification and have liberal views on individual rights and immigration, whereas the losers were expected to be largely Eurosceptic, conservative on issues of individual freedom and against the idea of the multicultural society. On the basis of a comparative study in six countries,
Table 5. Distribution of types of voters in EU countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Type 1: Left-wing/tough on immigration</th>
<th>Type 2: Right-wing/tough on immigration</th>
<th>Type 3: Right-wing/soft on immigration</th>
<th>Type 4: Left-wing/soft on immigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jowell et al. (2005).
Kriesi and his co-authors found empirical evidence for the emergence of such a second dimension in the party systems of these countries, separate from the ‘traditional’ socio-economic dimension.

In this study, we attempted to cross-validate the findings of Kriesi et al. with the use of different data sources. Moreover, we analysed a larger set of countries. Our analyses based on expert surveys of party positions did not reveal the same structure that Kriesi et al. detected at the party side. The model of Kriesi was, however, confirmed at the level of citizens. Attitudes of citizens towards a number of salient issues turned out to be structured by two dimensions: a socio-cultural dimension virtually orthogonal to a socio-economic dimension ($H2a$). The two dimensions are about as important (explaining 29 and 24 per cent of the variance, respectively) and hardly correlated ($r < 0.1$). The evidence indicates that the first dimension is mainly a socio-economic dimension ($H2b$), but the evidence is limited due to limitations in the data. The second dimension structures positions on immigration, European integration and individual rights and freedoms ($H2c$). The results of our analyses, including representative samples of voters in 15 countries ($n = 22,815$) and their preferences concerning five issues, is in line with the ‘winners and losers of globalisation’ thesis put forward by Kriesi et al. (2008).

Party positions are, however, not structured in a similar way. On the basis of positions of 82 parties in 14 different countries on seven issues, parties turn out to be lined up in a largely one-dimensional way. In contrast to the structure in position taking of citizens, party positions are largely structured by one dominant dimension, with the exception of EU integration. The exception of an EU integration dimension is in line with previous research (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2002). The general one-dimensional structure of party competition, however, contradicts claims about two-dimensionality made by Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008). This means that $H1a$, $H1b$ and $H1c$ are to be rejected.

Why do our results differ from those of Kriesi et al.? Many reasons could be singled out – for example, the experts in the surveys that we use are biased in different ways than the journalists who write the newspaper articles on which Kriesi et al. base their conclusions. One could think, for instance, that the unidimensional structure is a consequence of the fact that political scientists are socialised in seeing the world in terms of left-right only. However, this does not explain why positions on European integration – measured by expert surveys – are not correlated with left-right positions. Moreover, even though some political scientists have argued that concrete issues become integrated into left/right, there are several political scientists who have proposed that we need at least two dimensions (Middendorp 1991; Kitschelt & McGann 1995). While expert surveys are certainly not without their problems (e.g., Mair
2001), it has been demonstrated that they provide valid estimates of party positions (Steenbergen & Marks 2007).

Why would expert judgements provide a better image of party positions than the content analysis of editorial sections of newspapers? Not because the ‘experts’ know more about politics than the journalists who write about politics. In fact, various studies have shown that average perceptions of voters are highly accurate when they are compared with party positions based on roll calls, even the least sophisticated ones (Van der Brug 1998). A more detailed analysis of the Netherlands showed that average perceptions of voters match the perceptions of experts. They also perceive a one-dimensional party space, even though their own attitudes are structured by two dimensions (Adriaansen et al. 2005). We think it is most plausible that if journalists were asked to fill in the expert surveys, this would generate the same estimates of party positions.

The difference between the content analysis of newspapers and expert surveys do not stem from different perceptions of experts and journalists, but from the fact that the content of news depends on the issues that are on the political agenda. Kriesi et al. (2006) operationalise the dimensional structure of the party political space on the basis of three subsequent elections. Party positions in this space are, however, computed separately for each of the three election years. If one looks at the party positions in these political spaces, it is striking how much parties change from one election to the next. These changes are so large that they clearly do not measure ideological positions only, which is what these positions ought to measure if they were indicative of cleavages as Kriesi et al. suggest. The problem is that changes in the contents of editorial sections of newspapers not only reflect ideological changes, but also changes in the issues that happen to be on the political agenda at different moments in time. The data used by Kriesi et al. provide interesting insights into changes in the issues discussed in the political agendas and in the way parties are represented in newspapers, yet they are not the most appropriate data to measure changes in ideological positions of parties.

What implications does this have for the thesis that a new cleavage has emerged separating the winners and losers of globalisation? Clearly attitudes of voters on the ‘cultural’ issues are structured by a different dimension than their attitudes on socio-economic issues. However, voters can only choose from the parties on offer, so that divisions among voters can only become cleavages if these are reflected in the party system of a country. Our analyses show that this is not (yet) the case.

Since policy positions of parties are largely structured by one dimension, there are hardly any parties that are left-wing on socio-economic issues and right-wing on cultural issues, or vice versa. Yet, since voters’ positions on these
matters are structured by two dimensions, there are many voters with these combinations of opinions. The fact that certain segments of the electoral market are not represented at the supply side, has two implications. First of all, it is problematic from the point of view of democratic representation. Voters will not be able to vote for a party that represent their views. In most West European countries there is a very large group of voters with left-wing positions on socio-economic policies and right-wing positions on the cultural dimension. Ever since Lipset (1960) wrote about working class authoritarianism, there has been an interest among scholars in a particular segment of the electorate who favour left wing socio-economic policies, while having conservative views on cultural and moral issues. Most of the work in this tradition focuses on the link between social class, on the one hand, and authoritarian attitudes or voting behaviour, on the other (Dekker & Ester 1987; Achterberg & Houtman 2006). Kriesi et al. (2008) show that positions of citizens on the economic and cultural dimension can be explained to some extent by education and social class. Yet, they do not single out the specific group of citizens with ‘left-wing’ positions on economic issues and ‘right-wing’ positions on moral and cultural issues. Exploring the socio-economic background of this group is beyond the scope of this article, but it seems an important topic for future research. This very large group of voters is politically not represented as such parties do not exist.

Second, this contributes to the volatility of election outcomes. Which party should a voter choose who has a left-wing position on socio-economic issues and a right-wing position on cultural issues? If she is mainly concerned about economic issues, she will vote for a left-wing party, but if her main concern is about immigration, she will vote for a right-wing party. The voter may thus move from one side of the political spectrum to the other, depending on the saliency of different types of issues. Elections are therefore increasingly decided by the issues that dominate the agenda during the campaign (see, e.g., Maddens 1996; Petrocik 1996; Van der Brug 2004).

The existence of such a large group of citizens who are not politically represented could possibly give rise to important changes in the party systems. It is difficult to predict what types of changes will occur. Given the distribution of voters, the winning formula for far right parties does not seem to be to occupy a right-wing position on both dimensions as Kitschelt and McGann (1995) argued, but to position themselves more to the left in socio-economic terms as Kitschelt (2004) argued recently. Socialist parties stand to gain somewhat by becoming more right-wing on cultural issues, and it seems not unlikely that they will slowly adapt their policy positions to meet the demands of voters (see also Azmanova 2004). It is even conceivable that we may see the rise of left-wing anti-immigration parties in the future.
Acknowledgements

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Appendix. The questions asked in the expert surveys used in this article.

2002 Chapel Hill dataset (Hooghe et al. 2002)

Hooghe, Marks, Steenbergen and Vachudova compiled a dataset on the basis of an expert survey conducted by them in 2002–2003. The questionnaire was sent to 636 country experts in 25 of the 27 current EU Member States. Estonia and Luxembourg were the exceptions. The dataset contains the positioning of 171 parties in the 25 countries under study on various issues. The focus of the survey was on European integration, but the experts were asked to position the parties on other dimensions as well. The data were downloaded from Marks’ website (www.unc.edu/~gwmarks/data.htm). In the following, the descriptions of the dimensions used in this article are listed as in the codebook (also downloaded from the website).

European integration
POSITION = overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration in 2002 (Q1 of the party survey):

1 = Strongly opposed to European integration
2 = Opposed to European integration
3 = Somewhat opposed to European integration
4 = Neutral, no stance on the issue of European integration
5 = Somewhat in favour of European integration
6 = In favour of European integration.
7 = Strongly in favour of European integration
EU-enlargement

ENLARGW = position of the party leadership in 2002 on enlargement (Q11 of the party survey):

- 1 = Strongly opposes accession of large wave
- 7 = Strongly favours accession of large wave
- 8 = Party has not taken a position (coded as missing)

Left-right

LRGEN = position of the party in 2002 in terms of its broad ideological stance, where 0 indicates that a party is at the extreme left of the ideological spectrum, 10 indicates that it is at the extreme right, and 5 means that it is at the centre (Q14 of the party survey).

Economy

LRECON = position of the party in 2002 in terms of its ideological stance on economic issues (role of government in economy), where 0 indicates that a party is at the extreme left of the ideological spectrum, 10 indicates that it is at the extreme right, and 5 means that it is at the centre (Q15 of the party survey).

GAL-TAN

GALTAN = position of the party in 2002 in terms of its ideological stance on democratic freedoms and rights (role of government in life choices), where 0 indicates that a party is at the extreme left of the ideological spectrum, 10 indicates that it is at the extreme right, and 5 means that it is at the centre (Q16 of the party survey).

Benoit and Laver (2006)

In addition, the answers to two questions asked by Benoit and Laver (2006) were used in this article. They conducted an expert survey between late 2002 and early 2004 in 47 countries, mainly in Europe. The response rate per country had a mean of 28 per cent, and 1,491 experts completed the questionnaire. This resulted in the placement of 387 parties on a total of 37 unique policy dimensions (Benoit & Laver 2006: 81). The exact wording of the two questions employed in this article is reproduced below.

Taxes versus spending (Benoit & Laver 2006: 168)

Promotes raising taxes to increase public services. (1)
Promotes cutting public services to cut taxes. (20)
Immigration (Benoit & Laver 2006: 173)
Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into [country name] society. (1)
Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants return to their country of origin. (20)

Notes

1. The argument developed here is based on Schattschneider (1975 [1960]), who, however, does not make this distinction between government and opposition parties.
2. E.g., all Dutch left-leaning parties, including the libertarian D66, have moved from one end of the libertarian dimension to the other between 1994 and 2002. Between 1994 and 1998, the German Social Democrats moved from a very liberal position on the cultural dimension to a centrist one, which is the same as the Christian Democrats in 1994. Between 1994 and 1999, the Austrian Christian Democrats moved from the most right-wing position on the left-right dimension to a rather left-wing position.
3. According to Kriesi et al. (2006), positions on environmental protection have also become integrated in the ‘economic dimension’. We will, however, not include positions on ‘environmental protection’ in these analyses because we have no data about voters’ positions on this issue.
4. A PCA with three items (‘cultural threat’, ‘economic threat’ and ‘whether immigrants make a country a better or worse place’) yields a single factor solution that explains 77 per cent of the variance. The latter item (‘whether immigrants make a country a better or worse place’) has the highest loading, which shows that it has most variance in common with the other two.
5. Formally speaking, the error terms of the two EU-related variables are correlated, not the manifest variables themselves.
6. Confirmatory factor analysis and principal component analysis can yield deceptive conclusions if the items are skewedly distributed. When two items have a different skewed distribution, they cannot be strongly correlated even if they measure the same latent variable. Factor analysis would then wrongly suggest that the items measure different traits (Coombs 1964; Van Schuur 2003). We have carefully checked for this, but in all cases, low correlations are not caused by differences in distributions of the manifest items. We therefore feel that PCA is warranted.
7. The model presented in Figure 2 is not identified. In order to test the model, we fixed two unstandardized effect coefficients at unit: the effect of the economic dimension on the item of ‘income distributions’ and the effect of the cultural dimension on the item of ‘EU policies’.
8. Positions on income distribution were recoded so that categories 1 and 2 (‘fully agree’ and ‘agree’) are merged into one category; category 3 (‘neither agree nor disagree’) is in the neutral category; and 4 and 5 (‘disagree’ and ‘fully disagree’) are in the disagree group. Positions on immigrants are recoded so that 0–4 are in one category (‘better’), 5 is coded ‘neutral’ and 6–10 are coded ‘worse’.
9. In Table 5 we distinguish between, on the one hand, those who agree with the statement that income differences should be reduced and, on the other, those who either disagree,
or who neither agree nor disagree. Those with a centre position on ‘immigration’ are not included in the four categories in Table 5.

References


Address for correspondence: Wouter Van der Brug, Oudezijds Achterburgwal 237, 1012 DL Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: W.vanderBrug@uva.nl